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Abstract: In this paper we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple two-
person fishery management game. Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered.
Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic framework has no implications
for the equilibrium actions, whereas in the deterministic formulation as well the number of as the
equilibrium actions themselves depend on the model parameters. The various equilibrium actions
predicted using the deterministic framework seem to be quite plausible.
Keywords: linear quadratic differential games, feedback information structure, soft-constrained
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1 Introduction
Dynamic game theory brings together three features that are key to many situations in economy,
ecology, and elsewhere: optimizing behavior, presence of multiple agents, and enduring consequences
of decisions. For that reason this framework is often used to analyze various policy problems in
these areas (see e.g. [6], [12] and [14]). Here we consider a fourth aspect, namely robustness with
respect to variability in the environment. In the formulation of differential games, usually, a set of
differential equations is specified including input functions that are controlled by the players, and
players are assumed to optimize a criterion over time. The dynamic model is supposed to be an exact
representation of the environment in which the players act; optimization takes place with no regard
of possible deviations. It can safely be assumed, however, that agents in reality follow a different
strategy. If an accurate model can be formed at all, it will in general be complicated and difficult
to handle. Moreover it may be unwise to optimize on the basis of a too detailed model, in view
of possible changes in dynamics that may take place in the course of time and that may be hard
to predict. It makes more sense for agents to work on the basis of a relatively simple model and
to look for strategies that are robust with respect to deviations between the model and reality. In
an economic context, the importance of incorporating aversion to specification uncertainty has been
stressed for instance by Hansen et al. [9].
In control theory, an extensive theory of robust design is already in place; see Başar [2] for a
recent survey. We use this background to arrive at suitable ways of describing aversion to model
risk in a dynamic game context. We assume linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. These
∗This paper has been used to prepare a subsection of the book [7].
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assumptions are reasonable for situations of dynamic quasi-equilibrium, where no large excursions of
the state vector are to be expected.
Following a pattern that has become standard in control theory two approaches will be considered.
The first one is based on a stochastic approach. This approach assumes that the dynamics of
the system are corrupted by a standard Wiener process (white-noise). Basic assumptions will be
that the players have access to the current value of the state of the system and that the positive
definite covariance matrix does not depend on the state of the system. Basically it turns out that
under these assumptions the feedback Nash equilibria also constitute an equilibrium in such an
uncertain environment. In the second approach, a malevolent disturbance input is introduced which
is used in the modeling of aversion to specification uncertainty. That is, it is assumed that the
dynamics of the system are corrupted by a deterministic noise component, and that each player
has his own expectation about this noise. This is modeled by adapting for each player his cost
function accordingly. The players cope with this uncertainty by considering a worst-case scenario.
Consequently in this approach the equilibria of the game, in general, depend on the worst-case
scenario expectations about the noise of the players.
The analysis is restricted to the infinite-planning horizon case. Furthermore only the feedback
information structure is considered. For some results dealing with an open-loop information structure
see e.g. [7, Chapter 7.4], [1], [13] and [11].
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section formalizes the problem statement and
summarizes the main theoretical results. In section three we analyze the various equilibrium outcomes
for a simple fishery management problem. Section four concludes the paper with some general
observations.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we analyze a model that fits into the framework of a linear quadratic differential game.
Below we will recall here the required theoretical results on these games for the two-player case.
Proofs and the general N -player results can be found e.g. in [7, Chapters 8,9] or [3] and [4].











i , i = j.
Furthermore we will assume everywhere that the players have full access to the current state of
the system and that the set of control actions that are used by the players are the constant linear
feedback strategies. That is,
ui(t) = Fix(t), with Fi ∈ Rmi×n, i = 1, 2,
and where (F1, F2) belongs to the set
F := {F = (F1, F2) | A+B1F1 +B2F2 is stable}.
The stabilization constraint is imposed to ensure the finiteness of the infinite-horizon cost integrals
that we will consider. This assumption can also be justified from the supposition that one is studying
a perturbed system which is temporarily out of equilibrium. In that case it is reasonable to expect
that the state of the system remains close to the origin.
To make sure that our problem setting makes sense, we assume throughout this paper that the







2.1 The noise-free case
Our benchmark noise-free case is the minimization of the performance criterion
Ji(x0, u1, u2) = lim
T→∞
Ji(x0, u1, u2, T ) (2.1.1)
for player i, i = 1, 2, where




xT (t)Qix(t) + u
T
i (t)Riiui(t) + uj(t)Rijuj(t)
}
dt, j = i, (2.1.2)
subject to the dynamical system
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t), x(0) = x0. (2.1.3)
Here Qi and Rij, i, j = 1, 2, are symmetric and Rii, i = 1, 2, is positive definite. Notice that we do
not make any definiteness assumptions w.r.t. Qi.
The concept of a linear feedback Nash equilibrium on an infinite-planning horizon is then defined
as follows.
Definition 2.1 (F ∗1 , F
∗






2 ) ≤ J1(x0, F1, F ∗2 ) and J2(x0, F ∗1 , F ∗2 ) ≤ J2(x0, F ∗1 , F2)
for each x0 and for each state feedback matrix Fi, i = 1, 2 such that (F
∗
1 , F2) and (F1, F
∗
2 ) ∈ F . 
Unless stated differently, the phrases ”stationary” and ”linear” in the above definition will be dropped
here.
Next, consider the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations
0 = −(A− S2K2)TK1 −K1(A− S2K2) +K1S1K1 −Q1 −K2S21K2, (2.1.4)
0 = −(A− S1K1)TK2 −K2(A− S1K1) +K2S2K2 −Q2 −K1S12K1. (2.1.5)
Theorem 2.2 below states that feedback Nash equilibria are completely characterized by stabilizing
solutions of (2.1.4,2.1.5). That is, by solutions (K1, K2) for which the closed-loop system matrix
A− S1K1 − S2K2 is stable.
Theorem 2.2 Let (K1, K2) be a stabilizing solution of (2.1.4,2.1.5) and define F
∗
i := −R−1ii BTi Ki
for i = 1, 2. Then (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) is a feedback Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the cost incurred by player i
by playing this equilibrium action is xT0 Kix0, i = 1, 2.
Conversely, if (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) is a feedback Nash equilibrium, there exists a stabilizing solution (K1, K2) of
(2.1.4,2.1.5) such that F ∗i = −R−1ii BTi Ki. 
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2.2 Stochastic Approach
Next assume that the state of the system is generated by the linear noisy system,
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t) + w(t). (2.2.1)
The noise w is white, Gaussian, of zero mean and has covariance V > 0. The initial state at time
t = 0, x0, is a Gaussian random variable of mean m0 and covariance P0. This random variable is
independent of w.
Before we introduce the considered performance criteria first notice that, at least when Q > 0,
and one considers the with this game corresponding one-player stochastic regulator problem, the
corresponding cost become unbounded if T → ∞ (see e.g. Davis [5], pp.185). This is intuitively also
clear, as the system is constantly perturbed by the noise w. For that reason we have to adapt the cost
functionals for the players. Instead of minimizing the total cost, we will consider the minimization
of the average cost per unit time:









1 Ri1u1 + u
T
2 Ri2u2)dt}, i = 1, 2. (2.2.2)
Given this context, we consider the next equilibrium concept.
Definition 2.3 F̂ = (F̂1, F̂2) ∈ F is called a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilib-
rium if the following inequalities hold:
L1(V, F̂1, F̂2) ≤ L1(V, F1, F̂2) and L2(V, F̂1, F̂2) ≤ L2(V, F̂1, F2)
for each V ∈ V and for each state feedback matrix Fi, i = 1, 2 such that (F̂1, F2) and (F1, F̂2) ∈ F .
Here V is the set of all real positive semi-definite n× n matrices. 
Theorem 2.4 Let (X1, X2) be a stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equations (2.1.4,2.1.5)
and define F̂i := −R−1ii BTi Xi for i = 1, 2. Then F̂ := (F̂1, F̂2) is a stochastic variance-independent
feedback Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if (F̂1, F̂2) is a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash
equilibrium, there exists a stabilizing solution (X1, X2) of (2.1.4,2.1.5) such that F̂i = −R−1ii BTi Xi.
Moreover, Li(V, F̂ ) = tr(V Xi). 
Theorem 2.4 shows that the linear feedback Nash equilibrium actions from Theorem 2.2 are also
equilibrium actions for the stochastic game. Obviously, the corresponding cost differ. These cost
are difficult to compare, since in the stochastic framework the average cost is used as performance
criterion instead of the total cost.
2.3 Deterministic Approach
Our second approach to deal with uncertainty in the game assumes that the system is corrupted by
some deterministic input. The considered dynamic model reads now as follows:
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t) + Ew(t), x(0) = x0. (2.3.1)
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Here w ∈ Lq2(0,∞) is a q-dimensional disturbance vector affecting the system and E is a constant
matrix.
The description of the players’ objectives given above needs to be modified in order to express a
desire for robustness. To that end, we modify the criterion (2.1.2) to
J̄SCi (x0, F1, F2) := sup
w∈Lq2(0,∞)
Ji(x0, F1, F2, w) (2.3.2)
where
Ji(x0, F1, F2, w) :=
∫ ∞
0
{xT (Qi + F T1 Ri1F1 + F T2 Ri2F2)x− wTViw}dt. (2.3.3)
The weighting matrix Vi is symmetric and positive definite for both i = 1, 2. Because it occurs with
a minus sign in (2.3.3), this matrix constrains the disturbance vector w in an indirect way so that it
can be used to describe the aversion to model risk of player i. Specifically, if the quantity wTViw is
large for a vector w ∈ Rq, this means that player i does not expect large deviations of the nominal
dynamics in the direction of Ew. Furthermore, the larger he chooses Vi, the closer the worst case
signal he can be confronted with in this model will approach the zero input signal (that is: w(.) = 0).
In line with the nomenclature used in control theory literature we will call this the “soft-constrained”
formulation.
The equilibrium concept that will be used in this deterministic setting is based on the adjusted
cost functions (2.3.2). A formal definition is given below.
Definition 2.5 F = (F 1, F 2) ∈ F is called a soft-constrained Nash equilibrium if the following
inequalities hold:
J1(x0, F 1, F 2) ≤ J1(x0, F1, F 2) and J2(x0, F 1, F 2) ≤ J2(x0, F 1, F2)
for each x0 and for each state feedback matrix Fi, i = 1, 2 such that (F 1, F2) and (F1, F 2) ∈ F . 





we have the next result.
Theorem 2.6 Consider the differential game defined by (2.3.1–2.3.2). Assume there exist real sym-
metric n× n matrices Xi, i = 1, 2, and real symmetric n× n matrices Yi, i = 1, 2, such that
− (A− S2X2)TX1 −X1(A− S2X2) +X1S1X1 −Q1 −X2S21X2 −X1M1X1 = 0, (2.3.4)
− (A− S1X1)TX2 −X2(A− S1X1) +X2S2X2 −Q2 −X1S12X1 −X2M2X2 = 0, (2.3.5)
A− S1X1 − S2X2 +M1X1 and A− S1X1 − S2X2 +M2X2 are stable, (2.3.6)
A− S1X1 − S2X2 is stable (2.3.7)
− (A− S2X2)TY1 − Y1(A− S2X2) + Y1S1Y1 −Q1 −X2S21X2 ≤ 0, (2.3.8)
− (A− S1X1)TY2 − Y2(A− S1X1) + Y2S2Y2 −Q2 −X1S12X1 ≤ 0. (2.3.9)
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Define F = (F 1, F 2) by
F i := −R−1ii BTi Xi, i = 1, 2.
Then F ∈ F , and F is a soft-constrained Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the worst-case signal w̄i
from player i′s perspective is
w̄(t) = V −1i E
TXie
(A−S1X1−S2X2+MiXi)tx0.
Moreover the cost for player i under the realization of his worst-case expectations are
J
SC
i (F 1, F 2, x0) = x
T
0 Xix0, i = 1, 2.
Conversely, if (F̄1, F̄2) is a soft-constrained Nash equilibrium, the equations (2.3.4–2.3.7) have a set
of real symmetric solutions (X1, X2).
Corollary 2.7 If Qi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and Sij ≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2, the matrix inequalities (2.3.8–2.3.9) are
trivially satisfied with Yi = 0, i = 1, 2. So, under these conditions the differential game defined by
(2.3.1–2.3.2) has a soft-constrained Nash equilibrium if and only if the equations (2.3.4–2.3.7) have
a set of real symmetric n× n matrices Xi, i = 1, 2. 
Remark 2.8 This deterministic formulation allows also for a stochastic interpretation. This inter-
pretation can be given based on the well known connection between the H∞ control problem and
the risk sensitive Linear Exponential Quadratic Gaussian (LEQG) control problem (see e.g. [2], [1,
Section 4.7], [8], [10], [15] and [17]). Details on this can be found e.g. in [7].
3 A fishery management game
This section illustrates some consequences of taking deterministic noise into account by means of a
simple fishery management problem.
Consider two fishermen who fish a lake. Let s be the number of fish in the lake. Assume that the
price p(t) the fishermen get for their fish is fixed, i.e.,
p(t) = p.
The growth of the fish stock in the lake is described by
ṡ(t) = βs(t)− u1(t)− u2(t)− w(t), s(0) = s0 > 0
where w is a factor which has a negative impact on the growth of the fish stock (e.g. water pollu-
tion, weather, birds, local fishermen etc.). Both fishermen have their own expectations about the








e−rt{−pui(t) + γiu2i (t)− viw2(t)}dt, i = 1, 2,
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where
Faff := {(u1, u2) | ui(t) = fiis(t) + gi, with β − f11 − f22 < 1
2
r}.
In this formulation all constants, r, αi, β, γi and vi, are positive. The term γiu
2
i models the cost
involved for fisherman i in catching an amount ui of fish. We will assume that vi > γi, i = 1, 2.
That is, each fisherman does not expect that a situation will occur where the deterministic cost will
be larger than his normal cost of operation. Notice that, since in this formulation the involved cost
for the fishermen depends quadratically on the amount of fish they catch, catching large amounts of
fish is not profitable for them. This observation might model the fact that catching a large amount
of fish is, from a practical point of view, impossible for them. This might be due to either technical
restrictions and/or the fact that there is not an abundant amount of fish in the lake. That is, catching
much more fish requires much more advanced technology which costs rise quadratically.







e−rt{[xT (t) uTi (t)]











− viw2(t)}dt, i = 1, 2,


























ũi := ui − p
2γi
, i = 1, 2,
















i (t)− viw2(t)}dt, i = 1, 2,



























With, x̂(t) := e−
1
2
rtx̃(t), ûi(t) := e
− 1
2
rtũi(t), i = 1, 2, and ŵ(t) := e
− 1
2

















i (t)− viŵ2(t)}dt, i = 1, 2,
















































































, i = 1, 2,
the inequalities (2.3.8–2.3.9) are satisfied.
In case the discount factor, r, is more than two times larger than the exogenous growth rate, β,








, i = 1, 2, (3.0.10)






That is, irrespective of the growth of the fish population, the fishermen catch a constant amount of
fish each time. This amount is completely determined by their cost function and the price of the
fish.













Then, the equations (2.3.4–2.3.5) can be rewritten as









































)x22 + rx3 = 0 (3.0.14)









































)z22 + rz3 = 0. (3.0.17)
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From the first equation (3.0.12) it follows that either








z1 = 2β − r.
In case (i), x1 = 0, (3.0.13,3.0.15) yields that x2 = 0 (under the assumptions that β = r and
β + γ2
v2
(β − r) = 0). Equation (3.0.14) shows then that necessarily x3 = − p24rγ1 . Equations (3.0.15–


















c := −p(γ1 + γ2)(2β − r)
2βγ1γ2
.
Similarly, a lengthy analysis of case (ii) shows that besides the solutions (3.0.10,3.0.18) this
set of equations has (given our parametric assumptions) still two other solutions. Introducing, for
notational convenience,




































































































To see whether they actually can arise as equilibria we have to verify whether there are parametric
conditions such that the stability constraints (2.3.6) and (2.3.7) are met. Straightforward calculations
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show that for each of these three equilibria (3.0.21–3.0.23) these stability conditions are satisfied if
and only if 2β−r > 0. As an example consider the equilibrium strategy (3.0.23). Using this strategy,



















, i, j = 1, 2, j = i.
Here, hi, i = 1, 2, 3, are some parameters which are not important for the stability analysis. The
claim follows then directly by considering the first entry of all these matrices. All these entries are
negative if and only if 2β − r > 0.
From this analysis it follows that if r > 2β the game has a unique equilibrium (3.0.11) which is
characterized by fishing a fixed amount of fish by both fishermen. Due to the large discounting rate
the players seem to be indifferent to their noise expectations. This, since the fixed amount of fish
they catch is independent of these expectations. This equilibrium results in a situation where, under







) and the deterministic negative
impact factor w is not too large, the amount of fish will grow steadily with a factor β. Notice that
the expected worst-case revenues (i.e. −J∗i ) of fisherman i are −x̂T (0)Xix̂(0) = p
2
4rγi
, i = 1, 2. This




e−rt{−pui(t) + γiu2i (t)}dt, i = 1, 2.
In case r < 2β a different situation occurs. Then, three different equilibria occur. Two equilibria
correspond with a situation where one fisherman fishes a fixed amount of fish, whereas the amount
of fish the other fisherman catches consists of a fixed amount (that might be negative, which can be
interpreted as that the fisherman plants some fish), and an additional amount that depends on both
the fishstock and his expectations about the deterministic disturbance. In the third equilibrium both
fishermen catch an amount of fish that depends on the fishstock additional to some fixed (possibly
negative) amount.
In case gi := vi(r − β)− βγi < 0 and the external factors w are modest, the fish stock will converge
to some fixed amount in the first two equilibria (3.0.21) and (3.0.22), respectively. This amount
depends on the actual realization of the external factor w. In case gi > 0, on the other hand, the
fish stock will grow steadily with a growth factor g provided s0 >
p(γ1+γ2)
2βγ1γ2(vi−γi) , i = 1, 2 (assuming
again that the external factors are not too unwildy). The expected worst-case revenues of one of the
fishermen, i, in these two equilibria are p
2
4rγi
(which coincide again with his actual obtained revenues),










γj(2β − r) cγj




γj(2β − r) cγj










i, j = 1, 2, j = i. Since the amount of fish catched by this fisherman now depends on the fish stock,
and thus in particular on the realization of the disturbance factor w, in general these worst-case cost
will differ from the actual revenues for him.
Notice that both H1,j and H2,j do not depend on the noise parameters and that H1,j is positive
semi-definite. Consequently,
γj
vj−γj H1,j in (3.0.24) reflects the for the fisherman involved cost due to
his (worst-case) expectations concerning the external factor w. This effect is almost negligible if the
fisherman expects a modest influence of w on the fish growth (i.e. if vi is at least a number of times
larger than γi). In that case the cost J
∗
i are close to the cost the fisherman has in the undisturbed
case (vi = ∞). In case the fisherman’s worst-case expectations about w are large (i.e. vi close to
γi) these worst-case expected cost are completely dominated by
γj
vj−γj H1,j. It seems reasonable to
take the view that a fisherman will only go fishing (assuming that he wants to have a profit even
under his worst-case expectations about w) if −J∗i is positive. This gives additional conditions on
the parameters that have to be satisfied to consider this equilibrium outcome as a realistic one.
Particularly when there is a very large initial fish stock, these conditions will usually not be satisfied.
But given our model assumptions this is a situation which we can rule out. Also, in case the expected
external factors w become dominating generically the revenues −J∗i become negative. This, since
H1,j in (3.0.24) is positive semi-definite. So, also in that case the equilibrium ceases to exist. Again
this case is intuitively clear. If there will be a large impact of ”external fishing”, almost no fish is
left in the lake. So the fisherman is confronted with exceptional cost to catch the remainder of the
fish. Since he gets a fixed price on the market for his fish he will quit fishing.






< 0. From this, one conclusion is that the more fisherman
j expects that the fish stock will be disturbed by external factors, the more fish he will catch himself.
Another conclusion is that the expected returns under the worst-case scenario decrease for a fisherman
if he expects more negative external impacts.























i, j = 1, 2, j = i, where hj = 2γivj−γjvi+γ1γ23d . For this equilibrium a similar analysis can be performed
as above, yielding similar conclusions. We will not elaborate those points here.
One point in which this equilibrium differs from the previous one is that the equilibrium action
and expected worst-case revenues depend on the opponent fisherman’s noise expectations. From













positive. This implies that each fisherman responds to an increase in worst-case expectations about
the external factors of the other fisherman by catching more fish. Furthermore, an increase of the
worst-case expectations of his colleague has a negative impact on his worst-case expected revenues.
This, contrary to his own reaction to an increase in worst-case expectations w.r.t. external factors.
If the fisherman expects himself more ”disturbances” he will react by catching less fish which has a
positive impact on his worst-case expected revenues.
Finally, straightforward calculations show that no one of the three equilibria Pareto dominates
another equilibrium. That is, comparing the worst-case revenues of any two of the above three
equilibria always one fisherman is better of in one equilibrium whereas the other is better of in the
other equilibrium.
For completeness we summarized in Tables 1 and 2 the various equilibria for the noise-free (c.q.
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Case r > 2β Revenues u∗i
F-man 1 d1 ū1
F-man 2 d2 ū2
Table 1: Noise-free Equilibrium revenues and actions if r > 2β
Case r < 2β I. Revenues u∗i II. Revenues u
∗














uf (t) + ū2 −kγ2 + d2 uf (t) + ū2 d2 ū2
Table 2: Noise-free Equilibrium revenues and actions if r < 2β
stochastic) case. These tables are obtained by considering vi → ∞ in the above analysis. In these






, k := (2β−r)(s0+ c2β−r )2, and uf (t) := (2β−r)s(t)+c.
Notice again that if the parameters are such that the revenues become negative, one may expect that
the corresponding equilibrium will cease to exist. Taking this into account, we see from Table 1, that
if r > 2β there will always be a unique equilibrium. If, on the other hand r < 2β, we observe from
Table 2 that the equilibrium combinations (I,II,III), (I,II), (I,III), (I), (II), (III) or none may occur.
4 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion we observe that taking noise into account has a number of consequences. First, in case
r > 2β, noise does not affect the outcome of the game. The fishermen keep fishing a fixed amount
over time.
If r < 2β the noise expectations do play a role. Three different equilibria may occur. Two equilibria
in which either one of the fishermen sticks to the noise-free optimal action and the other takes into
account the current fish stock and his worst-case expectations about the external factors in the
amount of fish he catches. At the other equilibrium both fishermen take simultaneously each other’s
noise expectations into account.
In all these equilibria we frequently observe a tragedy of common’s effect. That is: the reaction by
the fishermen to an expected more disturbed fish stock growth by either himself or his opponent is
to increase the number of fish they catch. Only in the last-mentioned equilibrium a reverse reaction
occurs: if a fisherman anticipates here a more disturbed environment he will catch less himself. This
effect is however crossed if he also observes an increased sensitivity of his colleague w.r.t. the external
factors.
Finally we observe that, assuming that the noise-free case has three equilibria, increasing the noise
level has as a consequence that the number of equilibria gradually declines from three to none.
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